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I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 2015, Wesley McCoy ("McCoy") was convicted of secondbrandishing a weapon, and destruction of property.' The court
murder,
degree
denied McCoy's motion for post-trial judgment of acquittal, and he was
sentenced to 40 years imprisonment for second-degree murder, one year for
2
brandishing, and one year for the destruction of property-McCoy appealed. On
August 19, 2014, McCoy and his girlfriend, Brittney Clark ("Clark"), got into a
3
domestic dispute that resulted in McCoy leaving her home. After the dispute,
Clark asked a friend to accompany her to McCoy's home to pick up her

I

State v. McCoy, No. 15-1142, 2016 WL 6651585, at *1 (W. Va. 2016).

2

Id.

3

Id.
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belongings.4 Clark and four others, including the victim, Justin Buell ("Buell"),
headed to McCoy's.5 Upon arriving, Clark and her friends found McCoy and
another man sitting on the porch.6 Two of Clark's friends entered the home to
retrieve her belongings. 7 During this time, McCoy and Buell, who were waiting
outside on the porch, argued about the situation that ultimately escalated to a
small scuffle. 8 After a short exchange of punches, the two men briefly separated.9
McCoy then brandished a knife and approached Buell." ° After another short
quarrel, McCoy stabbed Buell in the neck, fatally killing him. "
During the trial, the State sought to introduce prior bad act evidence of
a previous altercation McCoy was involved in. 2 Six years prior, in 2008, McCoy
was involved in an altercation which ended with McCoy stabbing the
provocateur. 3 While working at a gas station, McCoy was approached by a
Travis Farris ("Farris") who dated McCoy's girlfriend.14 Farris then physically
assaulted McCoy, who defended himself by pulling out a knife and stabbing
Farris several times. 15 After investigating the stabbing, police found that McCoy
acted in self-defense and he was not charged for this conduct.16
The prosecution argued the prior bad act evidence was relevant in
finding McCoy's intent, his state of mind, and whether he acted with absence of
mistake. 7 Additionally, the prosecution sought to use the evidence to rebut
McCoy's defense that he suffered a diminished capacity. 18 Over McCoy's
objection, the trial court permitted the jury to hear evidence of the 2008
stabbing.1 9

4

Id.

5

Id.

Id. McCoy claimed self-defense because he and his friend were "minding [their] own
business and drinking on [McCoy's] own porch." Id. at *2. The Court did not accept his argument
and ultimately refused to grant a self-defense instruction. See id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
6

9

10

I
12

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *34.

14

Id. at *3.
Id.

15

Id.

13

Id. at n.5. McCoy was subsequently charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon in
connection with the 2008 stabbing. Id.
16

17

Id. at *3.

18

Id.
Id.

19
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the trial court
did not err in admitting the evidence because the probative value of the stabbing
2
was not outweighed by the prejudicial effect of its introduction. " The Court
found that the evidence of the previous stabbing could prove that McCoy
"intended to respond to a fist fight with knife violence and ...that using a knife
under such circumstances could cause serious or deadly harm."'" The Court held
that the prejudicial value was low because the 2008 stabbing was an act of selfdefense2 2 "thereby limiting any element of 'malice' that the jury may have
presumed." 23
In the dissent, then Chief Justice Ketchum thought that the majority
misapplied Rule 404(b): "evidence of petitioner's use of a knife years earlier to
defend himself from an unprovoked assault at his place of employment should
not have been admitted under Rule 404(b) to show intent or absence of mistake
in this case." 24 The Chief Justice felt that the circumstances between the prior
stabbing and the subsequent stabbing were "in no way similar" to each other.25
' 26
Further, he felt the evidence was not only irrelevant but "probative of nothing."
Under this analysis, if the evidence is truly probative of nothing, then evidence
of any prejudicial value would violate Rule 403. Furthermore, the Chief Justice
was concerned about the Court's willingness to allow Rule 404(b) evidence
because this evidence is "in practice, simply a way for prosecutors to show that
the defendant is a bad person and, therefore, guilty. '27 The dissent highlights
what many consider to be the biggest concern with admitted Rule 404(b)
evidence-that the jury will misuse the evidence to find the defendant guilty,
absent otherwise incriminating evidence.28
The impetus for this Note came from my evidence class with Professor
Marjorie McDiarmid. During which she highlighted the positive steps the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has taken to safeguard prior bad act
evidence under Rule 404(b), departing from both the federal interpretation and
the majority of states who adopted such interpretation. The Supreme Court of

21

Id. at *4.
Id.

22

On appeal, McCoy's first assignment of error argued that the trial court erred in not giving

20

the jury a self-defense jury instruction. Id. at * 1. He argued that he was entitled to the instruction
because such instruction is proper when he "presents any evidence supporting that defense,
regardless of the weakness or strength of that evidence." Id. at *2 (quoting State v. McCoy, 632
S.E.2d 70, 75 (W. Va. 2006)) (the defendant in the cited case bears no relation to Wesley McCoy).
Id. at *4.
23

24

Id. at *6 (Ketchum, C.J., dissenting).

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

See id.; JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 58.2 (3d ed. 1940).
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Appeals, rather, took steps for a rule that better protects adverse parties to such
evidence; however, one cannot ignore that rules and interpretations are subject
to change over the years.
This Note revisits over 30 years of jurisprudence and commentary
regarding Rule 404(b) evidence,29 and advocates that courts must be more critical
of prior bad act evidence, limiting its use to valid, fair, and nonprejudicial
purposes to preserve a party's right to a fair trial. Although this Note will
critically examine numerous cases that included prior bad act evidence, it is not
the intention of this Note to point fingers at judges or blame them for the
outcomes. Instead, this Note will proffer a more hardline rule that can be easily
applied, creating more predictability for judges, attorneys, and defendants alike.
Part H will provide the jurisprudential history of prior bad acts under
Rule 404(b) and how it is unique only to West Virginia and a handful of other
states. Most of West Virginia's development of case law occurred shortly
following the Supreme Court of the United States' own progeny of Rule 404(b)
cases. Part II of this Note will also look to how other states, departing from
Huddleston v. United States,3" have applied Rule 404(b) to prior bad act
evidence.
Part III will look to how West Virginia's unique application of Rule
404(b) withstood challenges over the last 20 years. Part II.A will begin by
addressing why the time has come to amend the rule. Part II.B will look to the
Chicago Jury Project-a long term sociological study of American juries. Part
III.C. 1 will look back at McCoy and how the trial court addressed the admission
of prior bad act evidence. Then, Part II.D will provide several methods the rule
could use to effect change for the better. First, Part III.D. 1 will look to amend
Rule 403 and break it up into a Rule 403(a) and (b). Next, Part III.D.2 will
introduce a second method through which the Rules of Evidence could be
modified to better protect defendants from the introduction of prior bad act
evidence.

H.

BACKGROUND

This Part will start off by discussing the Chicago Jury Projectexperiments conducted at the University of Chicago to explore the dynamic of
American juries. Next, Part H will describe how the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence have been interpreted in West Virginia over the past 30 years. Part JI.A
will also highlight the differences between how the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia and the Supreme Court of the United States have differed in
their interpretations of Rule 404(b). Part H.B will look to how other states have

29
Most of the commentary referenced in this Note discusses the Federal Rules of Evidence;
however, many of the same principles are universal throughout all jurisdictions that have adopted
all, or most, of the pertinent sections of Rule 404.
30
485 U.S. 681 (1988).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/10

4

Thomas: Will Rule 401(b) Ever Be Predictable
WILL RULE 404(B) EVER BE PREDICTABLE?

2018]

addressed Rule 404(b). Furthermore, Part 11.B will discuss the benefits of each
state's chosen path. Part II.C will look to the current state of Rule 404(b) in West
Virginia and how the rule has held up after 25 years. Finally, Part II.D will briefly
discuss the enactment and origins of Rule 404(b), prior bad act evidence.
Additionally, Part Il.D will discuss various reasons commentators and courts
have expressed views for amending Rule 404(b).
During the 1950s, the University of Chicago conducted social
juries. 31
experiments that analyzed various factors and their effect on American
34
33
32
The study was led by Harry Kalven, Hans Zeisel, and Fred Strodtbeck. The
study included statistical data on nearly 100 mock criminal trials held on either
burglary or incest charges. 35 Additionally, the survey also included over 3500
trial questionnaires from trial judges. 36 One of the many factors the researchers
sought to determine was the impact prior bad act evidence had on a jury's finding
of guilt. 37 The researchers found that conviction rates were significantly higher
when the jury learned that the defendant had a criminal record, regardless of the
severity of the crime. 3' Furthermore, the researchers concluded that a jury that
heard prior bad act evidence approached determining the defendant's guilt in a
39
drastically different way than a jury who had not. In 1966, the researchers
published The American Jury, a detailed account and compilation of the Chicago
Jury Project.4" Several decades after the Chicago Jury Project was completed,
courts still struggle with when prior bad act evidence should be admitted.
Like West Virginia's Rule 404(b), Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is a rule that prohibits a party from admitting prior bad act evidence
31

Chicago Jury Project,

CRIM.

JUST.,

http://criminal-justice.iresearchnet.com/forensic-

psychology/chicago-jury-project/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).

32 Harry Kalven was a professor of law at the University of Chicago and was regarded as the
leader of the Chicago Jury Project. Edward H. Levi, Harry Kalven Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2
(1975).
33 Hans Zeisel was a professor of law and sociology at the University of Chicago. Guide to the
Papers

Zeisel

Hans

1925-1992,

U.

CHI.

LIBR.,

(last
https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids/view.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.ZEISELH
visited Sept. 9, 2018). His research was primarily focused on the law and social sciences. Id.
34 Fred Strodtbeck, Social Psychologist, 1919-2005, U. CHI. NEWS OFF. (Aug. 17, 2005),
http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/05/050819.strodtbeck.shtml; ChicagoJury Project, supra
note 31.
35 ChicagoJury Project,supra note 31.
36

Id.

Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend FederalRule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat
to the Future of the FederalRule of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1487 (1985) [hereinafter The
Need to A mend].
38
Id.
37

39

Id.

40

HARRY KALVEN, JR.

&

HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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"to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.- 41 The rule intends to restrict occasions of a party's prior bad acts from
going before the fact-finder, fearing that a jury might feel inclined to punish the
party for a prior, unrelated act, rather than for the conduct at issue. 42 Although
applicable in both criminal and civil cases, the rule is most often used in criminal
cases where the prosecution wishes to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior
crimes or acts to show that the defendant is likely to have recidivated; however,
this use is strictly prohibited. 43
Rule 404(b) allows a party to admit such evidence if intended for other
purposes such as "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. ' 44 This nonexhaustive list of permitted purposes allows the introduction of evidence solely
to prove the party has previously committed a crime, wrong, or other act that
could be helpful for the jury in its fact-finding role. Unlike a confession, prior
bad act evidence is sometimes called dual purpose evidence-that is, not only
can Rule 404(b) evidence be used to show motive or intent, it also can be used
by the jury to make the "once a crook, always a crook" reference.4 5
A. Stepping Away from the Majority: West Virginia'sStricterApproach to
PriorBad Act Evidence
Since 1985, when West Virginia implemented the Rules of Evidence,
West Virginia's Rules 404 and 104 have remained nearly identical versions of
their federal counterparts. 46 Like many other jurisdictions, West Virginia's
courts have struggled with applying Rule 404(b) to the near infinite amount of
purposes for which a party may wish to introduce a crime, wrong, or other act.4 7
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in State v. Dolin,4 8 stated that
all evidence offered to the jury under Rule 404(b) must first be proven to the trial
court by clear and convincing evidence before being admitted into evidence.49

41

FED. R.

42

GLEN WEISSENBERGER

EvID. 404(b).
& JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY

156 § 404.12 (7th ed. 2014).

43

Id.

44

FED.

45

The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1487.
Compare
Rules
of
Evidence,

R.

EVID.

404(b)(2).

46
W.
VA.
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/WVCODE/MagRules_htm/RULES%200F%20EV1DENCE.htm,
with W. VA. R. EVID. 404, 104.
47
State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994).
48
State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1986).

49

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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The Court in Dolin had little reason not to adopt this standard given its wide
acceptance among other jurisdictions."
Until the Supreme Court decided Huddleston v. United States,

jurisdictions were divided over whether Rule 404(b) required a trial court to
make a preliminary finding by a preponderance of the evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or the less restrictive "sufficient evidence to support a
finding by the jury" standard. 5 ' In Huddleston, the defendant was charged with,
among other related crimes, one count of possession of stolen property in
interstate commerce.5 2 At trial, the government introduced two pieces of prior
bad act evidence.53 The first piece of evidence was testimony from a local record
store owner.5 4 The store owner testified that the defendant had sold him dozens
55
of televisions and allegedly could obtain several thousand more. The second
piece of prior bad act evidence was testimony from an undercover FBI agent who
posed as a buyer for an appliance store. 6 The agent testified that the defendant
had offered to sell him a large amount of kitchen appliances well below market
value.57 The district court admitted the two prior bad acts, and the defendant was
convicted.58

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction
stating that evidence should not be admitted absent "clear and convincing
evidence. 59 The government petitioned for rehearing and asked the court to
°
consider the recently decided United States v. Ebens,6 where a different panel
on the Sixth Circuit flopped, now requiring that the proponent of prior bad act
evidence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
performed the bad act.6 1 On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit applied the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard and found that the district court did
62
not abuse its discretion and affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that not only was the
preponderance of the evidence standard wrong, but that the district court
50

Id. at 215.

51

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).

52

Id. at 682.

53
54
55

Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.

56

57

Id.

58

Id. at 684.

59

Id.

60

800 F.2d 1422 (6thCir. 1986).

61

Id. at 1432.

62

United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974, 975 (6th Cir. 1987).
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misapplied that standard.63 Furthermore, the Court held that a district court must
only determine "if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury
that the defendant committed the similar act."' The Court stated that, unlike
Rule 403 and 402, Rule 404(b) does not require a preliminary showing before
such evidence may be introduced; rather, "[i]f offered for such a proper purpose,
the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility."65 By
following Rule 104(b), instead of Rule 104(a)'s requirement that a court make a
preliminary finding, the petitioner was concerned that this standard permits
evidence to be admitted that is less about proving motive, opportunity, or other
permitted purposes and more about convincing the jury that the defendant's
priors actions indicate the defendant's guilt to the alleged act.66 This is often
called the propensity inference. Addressing this concern, the Supreme Court
stated that despite not acting as the gatekeeper for Rule 404(b) evidence, proper
application of the rules will safeguard the defendant from improper Rule 404(b)
evidence being introduced.67 Furthermore, the Court believes that defendants are
protected by four requirements:
[F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy
requirement of Rule 402-as enforced through Rule 104(b);
third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule
403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice,... and fourth, from [Rule] 105, which provides that

the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper
purpose for which it was admitted.68
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was given the
opportunity, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Group,69 to depart
from Dolin's "clear and convincing evidence" standard and follow the Supreme
Court's holding in Huddleston. Taken nearly verbatim, the Supreme Court of
Appeals adopted Huddleston's holding, requiring only that "such evidence
should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury

63

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).

64

67

Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691-92.

68

Id.

69

419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992).

65
66
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that the defendant committed the similar act."7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with the Supreme Court's finding of
adequate protections of admitting improper evidence incorporated into Rule
404(b) to be sufficient; 1 however, the Supreme Court of Appeals failed to
explicitly overrule its previous holding in Dolin requiring that the judge decide
whether the evidence met the clear and convincing standard.72 In 1994, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia finally reconciled the conflict
between Dolin's clear and convincing evidence standard with TXO Productions
recent adoption of only requiring the judge to find "sufficient evidence to support
a finding" before allowing a jury to make the final determination.7 3
In State v. McGinnis, 74 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reviewed the admissibility of prior bad act evidence which led to a conviction of
first-degree murder. The facts of McGinnis are typical for cases that result in
Rule 404(b) challenges. On this night, the body of Kathy McGinnis was found
behind a shopping center. 7' Her body was found with a plastic bag over her head,
secured with a piece of telephone wire. 76 The next day, the defendant was found
in Kentucky beside his wrecked vehicle with telephone cord wrapped around his
neck, wrist, and ankles. 7 After hearing the defendant's recollection of the events,
and finding his story unconvincing, the police declared the defendant the prime
suspect.78

While police were investigating the murder of Kathy McGinnis, police
were working on another investigation involving the embezzlement of six
million dollars from the Nighbert Land Company.7 9 At the grand jury
proceedings, the prosecution presented evidence for both the first-degree murder
of Kathy McGinnis and embezzlement charges-the grand jury returned an
indictment for both charges.8 0 Shortly after the indictment, the defendant severed
the charges for trial." During the murder trial, the prosecution "spent a
substantial portion of the opening and three full days of its case discussing

70

Id. at 883 (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685).

71

Id. at 883-84.

72

See State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994).

73

Id. at 526.

74

455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994).

75

Id. at 520.
Id.

76

78

Id. at 521.
Id.

79

See id. at 522.

80

Id.

81

Id.

77
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collateral crimes evidence. 82 The remainder of the prosecution's case included
references to the collateral crimes.8 3 The prosecution
intended to establish that
84
the defendant had a motive to kill his wife.
During the trial, 15 of the prosecution's witnesses testified solely about
the collateral crimes.85 Even in closing arguments, the prosecution relied heavily
on the collateral crimes: "Mr. McGinnis was a suspect immediately in this
[murder] case because he was at the time of the death being investigated for
arson, tax evasion, embezzlement, and mail fraud, and his wife was found dead.
Use reason and common sense to determine why he was immediately a
suspect. '86 The trial court admitted the evidence using the Rule 104(b) recently
adopted in TXO Productions.87 The jury found the defendant guilty of firstdegree murder. 8
The Court in McGinnis reconciled the conflict created with the adoption
of Huddleston in TXO Productionsand the "clear and convincing" standard from
Dolin.8 9 Further, Justice Cleckley found it necessary to modify the holding in
TXO Productions to require first, that the trial court determine "by a
preponderance of the evidence that the acts were committed and that the
defendant committed them.9" Permitting the jury to hear such testimony before
such a finding was made, as proscribed by 104(b), would subject the defendant
"to an unfair risk of conviction regardless of the jury's ultimate determination of
these facts."91 Justice Cleckley intended this new standard to apply to all cases,
both criminal and civil, despite the opinion's exclusive use of "prosecution." 9
The Court reasoned that absent specific guidance in the Rules of
Evidence on Rule 404(b), a court should follow the "beyond a preponderance of
82

Id. at 528.

83

Id. at 529.

84

Id.

85

Id.
Id. at 529-30 (alteration in original).

86

90

Id. at 526.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 523 n.6.

87
88

89

By using the "prosecution" as the subject of our discussion, we do not mean to

imply that the application of Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence is limited to criminal cases. Although we apply it more often in the
criminal context, we also apply it to civil cases. Similarly, Rule 404(b)
evidence is equally available to a defendant in a criminal case. The standards
that we discuss for the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence in criminal cases
when offered by the prosecution apply to all cases.
Id.(internal citation omitted).
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the evidence" standard already used when determining the admissibility of
evidence such as confessions. 9" Under this new standard, the Court decided that
94
the trial court should act as a gatekeeper for evidence sought to be admitted. In
McGinnis, Justice Cleckley was persuaded by the Colorado Supreme Court's
reasoning in People v. Gardner,9 5 "' [g]iven the clearly recognized potential for
prejudice inherent in other-crime evidence, its seems more reasonable to us...
to require the trial court to be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence of the
96
conditionally relevant facts before permitting' the jury to hear them."
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted
Colorado's requirement that only after a trial court is satisfied that the evidence
has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, should a court further
97
consider whether the evidence is admissible under Rules 401, 402, and 403.
B. Remaining in the Minority: How Other State CourtsApply Rule 404(b)

Unlike West Virginia, many states have sided with the Supreme Court's
holding in Huddleston.98 However, states such as Colorado, New Hampshire,
and Ohio have chosen not to follow Huddleston.99 New Hampshire established a
three prong test in State v. Barker °° to determine whether to admit prior bad act
evidence.'' Under Barker, the court requires "evidence [to be] relevant for a
purpose other than showing the character or disposition of the defendant, that the
proof that the acts in question were committed by the defendant is clear, and that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice to the

93
Id. at 526; see State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994) (supporting the court's
discussion in State v. Clark, 297 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1982), on the duty of the court to make a
finding of fact and law for some types of evidence before the evidence may be put forth to a jury).
94
McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527.
96

People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991).
McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527 (quoting Garner,806 P.2d at 372 n.4).

97

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

95

If the trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts
or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the actor, the evidence
should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has been made,
the trial court must then determine the relevancy of the evidence under Rules
401 and 402 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing
required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

Id.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996); State v. Wright, 593 N.W.2d
1999); Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1996).
(S.D.
792
99
Garner,806 P.2d at 372; State v. Trainor, 540 A.2d 1236, 1238 (N.H. 1988); State v. Broom,
533 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio 1988).
100 374 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1977).
98

101

Id. at 1180.
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defendant." 10 2 This test, created pre-Huddleston, was applied again postHuddleston in State v. Trainor."°3 The Court again held that a trial court must
find "that there is clear proof that the defendant committed the prior offenses.""
Throughout the entire Trainor opinion, the Court made no reference to
Huddleston. °5 However, New Hampshire is not the only state to disregard
Huddleston. In State v. Broom,' °6 the Supreme Court of Ohio was silent on
adopting Huddleston but, rather, requires "substantial proof' that the defendant
107
committed the alleged similar act.
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Garner,'°8 as seen by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's reliance on its holding in
McGinnis, requires first that the judge apply Rule 104(a). 1°9 In Garner, the
defendant was charged with first-degree murder after his wife was found
strangled to death in her apartment. 110 During the trial, the prosecution offered
evidence of two other strangulations resulting in death, both of whom were
involved in intimate relationships with the defendant at the time. I The
prosecution sought to introduce the prior bad act evidence to establish the
identity of the defendant by way of his modus operandi.'1 2 The women in the
prior two murders were found in similar positions, suffered similar injuries, and
were killed shortly after announcing they wanted to break up with the
defendant. 1 3 The trial court permitted the evidence to be admitted, finding that
the evidence established the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the

102

Id.

103

Trainor,540 A.2d at 1238.

104

Id. at 1238.
See id.

105
106

107

State v. Broom, 533 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio 1988).
Id. at 690.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.

Omo R. EV. 404(b).
108
806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991).
109 See id.; State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994). The Colorado Supreme Court
decided Garner in 1991, just three years before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
decided McGinnis.
110
Garner,806 P.2d at 367.
I
112

Id.
Id.

113

Id. at 367-68.
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'
The defendant was
prior two crimes by "clear and convincing evidence." 114
15
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The appellate court held that prior bad act evidence introduced must be
established by clear and convincing evidence independently from "any other
evidence in the case in determining whether the defendant's identity as the
perpetrator of that other crime was adequately established."6 The Supreme
Court of Colorado granted certiorari to determine if the appellate court
"employed the proper standards in resolving the admissibility of other-crime
evidence." " 7
Several years after Garner and McGinnis were decided, the Arizona
Supreme Court in State v. Terrazas, 8 joined these states who deviated from the
Supreme Court of the United States. There, the court affirmed that prior bad acts
should: (1) be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) that the prior
bad acts were committed by the defendant. "' Like Colorado, West Virginia and
other states that have modified its standard of admissibility, Arizona retained the
20
four protective provisions the Supreme Court held in Huddleston.'
Acknowledging that many states use varying standards of admissibility for prior
bad act evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court shared similar concerns still
present today:

We believe there are important reasons to apply a clear and
convincing standard, rather than some lesser standard, to
evidence of prior bad acts. Such evidence is quite capable of
having an impact beyond its relevance to the crime charged and
may influence the jury's decision on issues other than those on
which it was received, despite cautionary instructions from the

judge. '21

The early decisions by states like Arizona truly concerned with the risk
of prior bad act evidence, repeatedly cautioned courts and counsel to "exercise
extreme care in its use, even where it is admissible." 2 2
In Terrazas, the defendant was suspected of stealing a car when police
found miscellaneous car parts from the stolen vehicle on the defendant's

114

Id. at 368.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 368-69.

117

Id. at 369.

118

121

State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194 (Ariz. 1997).
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.

122

Id.

119
120
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property.123 The defendant denied any involvement and knowledge of the
theft.124 During the bench trial, the State offered evidence of three other
occasions the defendant was suspected of stealing a vehicle. 125 Ultimately, the
126
court only considered two of the three other occasions.
Terrazas differs from Garner and McGinnis because the prior bad act
evidence did not affect the disposition of a jury against a defendant; rather,
Terrazas was a bench trial and the court of appeals found that the trial judge had
relied on the prior bad act evidence when determining the defendant's guilt by
extending its permitted use past establishing whether motive or plan could be
found. 127 The Court's finding in Terrazas shows that anyone, no matter the
position, can be influenced by the highly prejudicial effects that prior bad act
evidence can cause. Candidly, the purpose of this Note is not to accuse or blame
judges for disregarding the proper use of Rule 404(b) evidence; rather, the
purpose of this Note is to create a hardline rule to be applied by all judges with
greater uniformity in all jurisdictions.
C. Has McGinnis Withstood the Test of Time?
Nearly 25 years after McGinnis was decided, Justice Cleckley's
principles remain virtually untouched. 128 Within the last three years alone, the
Supreme Court of Appeals has discussed Rule 404(b) issues over 70 times.129
Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeals, in State v. Zuccaro, 3 ° reiterated the
importance that courts must first make a preliminary determination that the prior
bad act evidence is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 3' 1 that is, proven
to be more likely than not, before allowing the evidence to be offered to the
jury. 132

123

Id. at 1195.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

Id. at 1198.
W. VA. R. EVID. 404(b).
129
See, e.g., State v. Spinks, 803 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 2017); State v. Zuccaro, 799 S.E.2d 559
(W. Va. 2017); Ballard v. Hunt, 772 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 2015).
130
799 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 2017).
131
The legal standard, by a preponderance of the evidence, is often the burden of persuasion in
a civil case, as opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the burden of persuasion used in a
criminal case. Some have described the preponderance of the evidence standard as something that
is more likely than not, or when 51% or more of the evidence favors one side. Neil Orloff & Jery
127
128

Stedinger, A Frameworkfor Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-EvidenceStandard,131 U. PA.

L. REv. 1159 (1983).
132
Zuccaro, 799 S.E.2d at 564.
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In Zuccaro, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim
was a drug dealer and had illegally sold firearms.' 33 This evidence was intended
to show that the victim was involved in illegal and dangerous activities, and
therefore, could have been killed by another person. 34 The Court denied the
defendant from introducing this evidence because he "failed to provide credible
evidence to show the victim was a drug dealer or had illegally sold guns or
silencers." '35
Further, the Court in Zuccaro reaffirmed its holding in McGinnis that
evidence subject to ajudge's preliminary determination is not limited to evidence
offered by the prosecution, but applies to all evidence of "other acts" offered by
' The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the rule in McGinnis was
any party. 36
based on policy considerations preventing a criminal defendant to face an "unfair
risk of conviction."' 37 Although this risk was a guiding consideration in
McGinnis, the Court in Zuccaro conceded that the risk of prejudice is far less
likely when the defendant offers collateral evidence against a third person, "the
State nonetheless has a legitimate interest in avoiding the presentation of
unreliable and false collateral evidence to the jury."' 38 For the same reasons a
jury could convict a defendant because of excessive prior bad acts, the Court
stated that evidence of the victims bad acts could cause ajury to "ignore evidence
showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim was cast as a bad
person who 'deserved what he got."' '"
Although a defendant has a valid defense to a first-degree murder charge
by showing that another individual committed the murder, a defendant may not
speculate that a victim's prior bad acts "could have exposed the victim to bad
people who might have decided to kill him."' 4 ° Once again, the Supreme Court
of Appeals found guidance from the Colorado Supreme Court :
The touchstone of relevance in this context is whether the
alternate suspect evidence establishes a non-speculative
connection or nexus between the alternate suspect and the crime
charged. Where the evidence concerns other acts by the alternate

134

Id.
Id.

135

Id.

133

136
137

138

Id. at 573-74.

Id. at 573.
Id. (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998)) ("State and Federal

Governments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is
presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the exclusion of unreliable evidence is a
principal objective of many evidentiary rules.").
139 Id.
140 Id. at 570.
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suspect, a court must look to whether all the similar acts and
circumstances, taken together, support a finding that the same
person probably was involved in both the other act and the
charged crime.14 1
D. A Long History ofDispute: The Need to Amend Rule 404(b)
Officially enacted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence provided
federal courts with the first set of uniform rules of evidence. 42 Not long after its
enactment, many rules undertook substantive changes.143 Like many of the
originally enacted rules, Rule 404(b) is the codification of a pre-existing common
law doctrine used by the courts. Rule 404(b) was commonly referred as the
"uncharged misconduct doctrine" or the "doctrine of chances."'" Since the
Federal Rules have been enacted, Rule 404(b) has been the most litigated Rule
of Evidence. 145 This is likely because of the "enormous increase in the use of
extrinsic crime evidence" since the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted. 146
Both before and after the Supreme Court decided Huddleston, commentators
objected to Rule 404(b), noting fundamental flaws with its application. "' Rule
404(b) has been criticized for its unworkable standards, 148 the risk the jury will
make propensity inferences, 49 and placing the burden of demonstrating the
50
evidence should be excluded on the defendant. 1
Id. at 574 (quoting People v. Elmarr, 351 P.3d 431, 438 (Colo. 2015)).
FRE Legislative History Overview Resource Page, FED. Evin.
REV.,
http://federalevidence.com/legislative-history-overview (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
143
See id. During that first year, five rules were amended. Id. In the first five years, one rule
was added and two were amended. Id. By the end of 1987, nearly every Federal Rule of Evidence
was amended. Id.
144
WIGMORE, supra note 28; The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1467; David P. Leonard,
The Use of UnchargedMisconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REv. 116, 160-61
(2002). See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Criminal Minds: The Need to Refine the Application of the
Doctrineof Objective Chances as a JustificationforIntroducing UnchargedMisconduct Evidence
to Prove Intent, 45 HOFSTRA L. REv. 851 (2017).
145
The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1467. See Paul S. Milich, The DegradingCharacter
Rule in American CriminalTrials, 47 GA. L. REv. 775 (2013).
146
Abraham Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b),
608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 142 (1989).
147
See, e.g., The Need to Amend, supra note 37; Ordover, supra note 146; Edward
Imwinkelried, "Where There's Smoke, There's Fire": Should The Judge or The Jury Decide The
Question of Whether The Accused Committed An Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under
FederalRule of Evidence 404?, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 813 (1998) [hereinafter "Where There's
Smoke "]; Milich, supra note 145.
148
Milich, supranote 145, at 778; "Where There's Smoke, " supra note 147, at 836.
149
Milich, supranote 145, at 785.
150
The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1465.
141
142
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Those who think Rule 404(b) contains nearly unworkable standards are
51
really highlighting how there is great disparity among courts in its application.
Some have cited that judges will favor the admittance of prior bad act evidence
52
because the judge does not want the defendant to be viewed in a "false light."'
Another reason commentators think that the rule is unworkable is because of the
disparate treatment some courts give to Rule 404(b) evidence offered against the
53
defendant with the evidence offered against the government. '
Another reason Rule 404(b) is often criticized is because of the risk the
jury will make a propensity inference. A propensity inference suggests that
"because the accused has a particular character trait he or she probably acted in
committed
conformity with that trait at the time in question and therefore ...
the crime charged." 5 4 This argument rests on the endless "proper" purposes Rule
404(b) provides.' 5 5 Many fear that Rule 404(b) operates as a way for parties to
56
skirt around the prohibitions of character evidence under Rule 404(a).'
Furthermore, the argument exists that the wrong party is given the burden under
404(b)-that is the defendant is the party with the often higher burden of proving
57
At common law,
to the court that prior bad act evidence should be excluded.
should be
the
evidence
that
to
prove
the
proponent
on
the burden was always
58
Justice
the
rules,
admitted.' However, during legislative hearings of the federal
Department successfully argued to reverse this standard. "I Given the change in
stance the rule took, some might argue that Congress should have been more
explicit with their repudiation of the rule.' 60 Either way, the burden (at least for
now) remains with the defendant.
It is this unsettled landscape of Rule 404(b) this Note is set in. It is the
fear that the American justice system has far too many "Wesley McCoy's," and
the fear they might not have a fair shake at trial. The forthcoming Part will
expand upon West Virginia case law with an eye towards amending the Rules of
Evidence.

151

See Ordover, supra note 146, at 143.

152

Id.

153 Id.
154 Milich, supra note 145, at 778.
155 See Antonia M. Kope6, They Did It Before, They Must Have Done It Again; The Seventh
Circuit's Propensity to Use a New Analysis of 404(b) Evidence, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1055, 1070
(2015).
Milich, supra note 145, at 778.
156
157

See The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1483-85.

158 Id.
159

160

Id. at 1483.
Id.
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ANALYSIS

Although the framework established by the Supreme Court of Appeals
over 20 years ago remains intact, the question must be asked about whether this
is a good thing. This Part will look to the future of Rule 404(b). More
specifically, this Part will start off addressing how the rule could be modified to
better address the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeals so many
years ago in McGinnis.161 Part II.A will explain why the time is ripe for the
Court to reexamine the current state of Rule 404(b) and whether it is being used
properly by courts. Part III.B will explain the method of effectuating possible
changes to the Rule to better address the concerns so many have with the Rule's
application. Part II.B will also discuss three options courts can take to make
positive steps towards further developing how prior bad act evidence is treated
in West Virginia and jurisdictions alike. All three of the suggestions, by
themselves, ultimately create a more hardline rule for courts. These proposed
amendments not only are more protective of a defendant's rights but are also
rooted in familiar methodologies to mitigate mistreatment or misapplication.
Additionally, the three proposed amendments all serve the same purpose:
implementing a higher standard of scrutiny to prior bad act evidence.
A. Amend Rule 404(b)."But Why Now?
Many commentators have urged that Rule 404(b) evidence should be
held to a higher level of scrutiny before it can be admitted as evidence. 162 This
argument rests on the idea, as Chief Justice Ketchum noted in McCoy, that
prosecutors "deliberately introduce[] extrinsic crime evidence [often] for the sole
purpose of prejudicing juries."163 There can be no doubt that some jurors might
disregard limiting instruction. No other explanation can account for the finding
that "[o]nce the jury learns that the defendant has a criminal past, the odds of
conviction skyrocket." 1 64 Despite instructions to limit the use of the prior bad act
evidence for a specific purpose (such as motive, intent, plan), and only for that
purpose without subscribing undue weight to the evidence, juries will continue
to misuse prior bad act evidence. This extrinsic evidence, "although not offered
to prove character, will require that the jury reason from character ... to reach
the non-character issue." 16' A call to amend Rule 404(b) is especially pressing in
This concern, as shown throughout the remainder of this Note, is held by nearly every
jurisdiction as Rule 404(b)'s biggest drawback.
162
See Ordover, supra note 146; The Need to Amend, supra note 37; Milich, supra note 145, at
161

781.
163
164
165

Ordover, supra note 146, at 146.
Milich, supra note 145, at 780.
Ordover, supra note 146, at 147.
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light of these demonstrable prejudices to defendants, and the Chicago Jury
Project only further supports that call to amend.
B. Chicago Jury Project and its Effect on PriorBadAct Jurisprudence
In 1966, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel published their findings from the
Chicago Jury Project in a book called The American Jury.' 66 It was expected that
their research would have a great impact on reforming many aspects of the
criminal justice system. The following year, the Supreme Court decided Spencer
v. Texas, 167 a case challenging the use of prior bad act evidence in the liability
portion of a trial for charges brought under a habitual offender statute.' 68 Much
like "felon not to possess" cases, the trial is bifurcated into liability for the
indicted charge, and if liability is found, the court holds the second portion of the
trial to determine if the defendant is a habitual offender, and thus, subject to
' In upholding the use of the defendants prior criminal
higher criminal penalties. 69
acts, the Court relied on the findings of the recently published The American
Jury: "Indeed the most recent scholarly study of jury behavior does not sustain
the premise that juries are especially prone to prejudice when prior-crime
evidence is admitted as to credibility." 7 0 However, as the dissent exclaimed, the
majority erroneously construed the findings in The American Jury."'7 A later
edition of The American Jury later confirmed Chief Justice Warren's
interpretation of the Chicago Jury Project and stated that the majority in Spencer
was incorrect.' 72 Rather, conviction rates were much higher when the jury knew
of the defendant's prior criminal or bad acts. 73 This erroneous finding is said to
'
have persisted throughout Huddleston. 74
C. A Look Back to McCoy: How Amending 404(b) Will Help
In McCoy, the Trial Court admitted evidence so the jury could use the
knowledge about the prior stabbing to show the defendant had the "ability to
form the specific intent required to prove the charged offense of murder." 7 5 The

166

See

167

385 U.S. 554 (1997).

168

Id.

169

Id. at 556-57.

170

Id. at n.8.

KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL,

supra note 40.

171 Id. at 575 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

&

supra note 40, at vi.

172

KALVEN, JR.

173
174

The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1465.
Ordover, supra note 146, at 149.

175

State v. McCoy, No. 15-1142, 2016 WL 6651585, at *3 (W. Va. 2016).

ZEISEL,
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prosecution offered the evidence of the prior bad act as evidence that McCoy
"intended to respond to a fistfight with knife violence and that petitioner knew
that using a knife under such circumstances could cause serious or deadly
harm."

176

Stepping back from the specific facts of McCoy, evidence that the
defendant was involved in a prior stabbing could be used in several ways. First,
if both occurrences were with the same individual, a court could find that the
defendant had prior malice against another individual. Another way Rule 404(b)
evidence could be used is to show that because the Defendant was involved in
similar acts, the defendant intended to perform a particular act or to show the
defendant acted absent a mistake.
However, when applying the specific facts of McCoy, the probative
value of the similar act evidence is significantly diminished. First, the time
.between acts is approximately six years. 177 Next, although both prior bad acts
involved McCoy's use of a knife in a stabbing, the inferences a jury could make
are reduced because of the differences of the events. Police cleared McCoy of
criminal liability in the 2008 altercation because it was found that McCoy had
used his knife in self-defense.' 7 8 The charged conduct, despite being argued by
McCoy as self-defense, was portrayed by the prosecution as a first-degree
murder case. 179 Revealing to a jury the facts behind a justified, self-defense
incident in no way helps the prosecution show intent, motive, or any of the
enumerated purposes.
As Chief Justice Ketchum noted, the two events had little in common,
except that both were stabbings. 180 The evidence of the prior bad act of selfdefense hypothetically infers no more than McCoy had at one time carried a knife
and that had used one before. However, practically speaking, the evidence
showed that McCoy had been involved in an altercation in which he brought out
a knife and stabbed someone. This permits the jury to engage in an unfair picking
and choosing when assigning weight of the evidence. This is exactly the concern
many fear the introduction Rule 404(b) evidence fails to adequately address.18 1
One commentator states that the ability of attorneys to "distinguish between the
18 2
improper . . . purpose and the proper . . . purposes is frequently limited."
176

Id. at *4.

177

179

See id.
Id.
See id.at *I.

180

See id. at *6.

178

See State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994); Ordover, supra note 146, at
134-35; STEPHEN P. MEYER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 31:11 (2017-18
ed. 2017).
182
Ordover, supra note 146, at 135. In his article, he is referring to the improper purpose, that
is "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character... to
181
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Furthermore, he states that "[t]he ability of a jury to use evidence admitted under
the Rule 404(b)83exception for a proper purpose, at least in intent cases, is highly
questionable."'

Here, the relevancy of the evidence is low because of the substantive
differences between the two acts. Looking back to Rule 403, which states that a
court should exclude evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence." 18 4 Applying this balancing test should have excluded the
evidence because the low probative value would have been outweighed by the
prejudicial value-knowledge that the defendant had gotten in an altercation that
ended in a stabbing. If the prosecution wished to introduce evidence that McCoy
carried a knife, evidence could have been introduced in a manner much less
prejudicial than through prior bad act evidence.
To start, McCoy was claiming self-defense. This alone establishes that
McCoy knew what kind of damage a knife could inflict by his carrying and
ultimately use of the knife. Next, as one commentator suggests, the ability to use
8' 5
prior bad act evidence in intent cases is "highly questionable." Finally, a jury
could easily find that McCoy acted absent a mistake, again, by McCoy's use of
the knife in self-defense. It is this situation this Note is intended to address; that
is, provide a solution to better safeguard defendants from prior bad act evidence.
D. Reformation of the Rule
Well before Huddleston was decided, some have called to amend Rule
86
404(b) to better protect parties from misuse of prior bad act evidence.' 1 When
looking towards reform, commentators primarily identified three rules that could
be amended or used to affect the admission of prior bad act evidence: Rule 104,
Rule 403, and Rule 404(b).18 7 Although there have been several ways to

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." FED. R. EVID.
404(b)(1). Further, the proper purpose being that "[t]his evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident." FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(2). The above quoted portions are
identical to their West Virginia counterparts. See W. VA. R. EvID. 404(b)(1), (2).
183 Ordover, supra note 146, at 135-36. It is important to bring back up the purposes offered
for using evidence of McCoy's prior bad act: "the ability to form the specific intent required to
prove the charged offense of murder." State v. McCoy, No. 15-1142, 2016 WL 6651585, at *3 (W.
Va. 2016) (emphasis added).
184

W. VA. R. EvID. 403.

186

Ordover, supra note 146, at 136.
See The Need to Amend, supra note 37.

187

See id.; Ordover, supra note 146; Milich, supra note 145.

853
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implement this new standard, the logic behind its intention are all grounded
behind similar concerns for misapplication and juror overvaluation. 88
This Note is centered on West Virginian jurisprudence, a state that has
held prior bad act evidence is subject to Rule 104(a)-meaning such evidence is
subject to passing judicial scrutiny before passing forward to the jury. For further
discussion and reasoning, see Part II and the accompanying cases. 8 9 As a result,
addressing the arguments between using Rules 104(a) and 104(b) in any depth is
beyond the scope of this Note.
Further, a change in how courts apply Rule 404(b) and address prior bad
act evidence can be achieved in several ways. As some commentators have
suggested, amending Rule 404(b) itself is the most direct way of achieving
change. This seems like the most logically sound method because the amendment
would not impact any other rules. However, some suggest looking farther than
the confines of Rule 404(b). These suggestions propose that a heightened
standard of scrutiny should be applied to prior bad act evidence than what Rule
403 provides.' 90 This Note proposes the most efficient way to effectuate a change
in how prior bad act evidence is used will consist of amending Rule 403.
1. Reverse Rule 403
The most direct way of changing how prior bad act evidence is treated
in courts does not consist of making the majority of changes to Rule 404(b), but
rather by amending Rule 403. Both federal courts and West Virginia utilize a
"reverse Rule 403" standard.' 9' This reverse Rule 403 standard is found in Rule
412 of both West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 92 Rule 412 governs when a party may introduce evidence in a sex
offense case of a victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition.193 The risks
in introducing evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition are that the jury might consider such evidence to justify the actions
of the defendant or in other words, "the victim was asking for it." Such inferences
are dangerous to bring before the jury.
188
189

See Milich, supra note 145, at 798.
See supra Part II.

190
The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1467; Franklin Cleckley & Marjorie McDiarmid,
Commentary on the Proposed West Virginia Rules of Evidence (2014) (on file with author).
191
In West Virginia, the "reverse Rule 403" standard is utilized in Rule 412. W. VA. R. EVID.

412(b)(2) ("the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and
of unfair prejudice to any party").

FED. R. EvIo. 412(b)(2); W. VA. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2).
See, e.g., W. VA. R. EvID. 412(b)(2) ("the court may admit evidence offered to prove a
victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party").
192
193
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The reverse Rule 403 standard is also utilized in Rule 609 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.' 9 4 Rule 609 governs when the prosecution may introduce
evidence of a defendant's prior conviction for purposes of attacking the witness's
' Typically, evidence of prior felony convictions are
character for truthfulness. 95
permitted to be introduced into evidence subject to Rule 403.196 However, when
more than 10 years have passed, the same convictions are subject to reverse Rule
403.197 The reason for such is obvious. The rule intends to protect defendants
from conduct so distant in relevance unless it absolutely must be considered.
Like using criminal convictions to impeach a witness, or using a victim's
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, using prior bad act evidence to show
that a party could possess the intent, plan, or the other permitted purposes should
be protected by the courts because of the same dangers this evidence can create.
However, under the current standards, prior bad act evidence-which can
include criminal convictions-is not held to the same heightened standard.
This Note proposes that Rule 403 could be amended, providing a
separate section that would apply to Rule 404(b) evidence. West Virginia Rule
of Evidence 403 states that "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
98
This
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."'
amendment could be made by splitting Rule 403 into two sections: Rule 403(a)
and Rule 403(b). Rule 403(a) would be verbatim to the current Rule 403.
However, Rule 403(b) would adopt this reverse Rule 403 standard by requiring
that evidence's probative value be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
value:
(b) Usin2 Evidence of Prior Bad Acts and Convictions
Against a Criminal Defendant. This subdivision applies to all
prior bad acts and criminal convictions. Such evidence may be
admitted if its probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
By keeping this standard separate, Rule 404(b) could require that prior bad act
evidence offered must first satisfy Rule 403(b) before a court should admit the
evidence.
Furthermore, if Rule 403 was amended by creating two sections, like
Rule 404(b), Rule 609 could be changed to include that evidence must meet the
new reverse Rule 403 standard, now in the new Rule 403(b):
194 See FED. R. EVID. 609(b)(2).
195

FED. R. EvID.

196

Id.

609(a).

197 FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
198 W. VA. R. EVID. 403. This language mirrors the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
See FED. R. EvID. 403.
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(b) Limit on usin2 the Evidence After 10 Years. This
subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since
the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it,
whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only
if the court determines, in the interests of justice, that:
(1) is admissible under Rule 403(b); and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written
notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair
opportunity to contest its use.
One benefit of changing Rule 403 is that Rules 609 and 404(b) would be
utilizing the same exact standard and not simply identical or comparable
language open for interpretation by courts. 199 This standard, now moved to Rule
403(b) would be familiar to all judges because of its use in Rule 609(b)(1). The
result would be that all evidence of prior bad acts, criminal or not, must pass the
heightened scrutiny of Rule 403(b). This would make solid steps forward to
protect the party opposed to the evidence sought to be introduced. By requiring
Rule 404(b) evidence to be subject to proposed Rule 403(b), the rule will be
treated as a rule of exclusion, not inclusion.
Several benefits stem from creating rules of exclusion rather than
creating rules of admission. First, a judge might have more peace of mind
knowing prior bad act evidence was admitted only after the substantial evidence
is offered to rebut the presumption of exclusion, and chances of an injustice
occurring are greatly reduced. Another benefit of changing Rule 404(b) into a
rule of exclusion is the presumption of innocence it offers the opponent of prior
bad act evidence. Although many should agree that prior bad act evidence can
be helpful for the court, the court should favor the presumption of innocence by
giving every benefit to the opposed party, preventing prejudicial evidence to be
properly screened. The presumption of innocence, in Rule 404(b) prior bad act
evidence, will remain weak unless something is done to better protect parties.
What benefit does a presumption of innocence have if it is "routinely trumped
by even the weakest argument by the state for the admission of 404(b)
evidence[?] ' 2°
2.

Amending Rule 404(b)

Another way to protect parties from introducing overly prejudicial prior
bad act evidence is by going straight to the rule and amending it. The remaining

199
200

Compare proposed Rule 403(b), with W. VA. R. EvID. 609(b).
See Milich, supra note 145, at 798. Milich seems to also view the need to amend Rule 404(b)

as a way to also keep judges honest and fair themselves. He seems to believe that judges might be
swayed by the prior bad act evidence in the same way that juries would. That is, a judge might be
inclined to introduce the evidence because he or she affected by the propensity argument.
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two methods of amending the Rules of Evidence reflect the least of amount of
deviance from the rules as they are written. First, here is a brief look back to how
Rule 404 is broken up. Rule 404 is divided into two sections: 404(a) and
404(b).2 °1 Rule 404(a) explicitly prohibits the use of character evidence,
"[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or
trait.

2 2

The next clause states that "Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a

20 3
Criminal Case" and then offers three exceptions to the prohibition. The next
' 20 4 Rule 404(b)
section, Rule 404(b), governs "Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
starts off like 404(a) explicitly prohibiting "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. "205 The
next clause however, diverts from the framework in Rule 404(a) by stating
permitted uses, and not providing exceptions to this rule.20 6

i.

Exceptionfor Criminal Cases

If, by amending Rule 403, creating two separate sections is viewed as
too drastic of a move, the reverse Rule 403 standard can be included directly into
Rule 404(b) without disturbing any other rule. In doing so, Rule 404(b) could be
amended by conforming to Rule 404(a) by including an exception for criminal
cases. Without having to change the listed "Permitted Uses" section, 404(b)(3)
would provide "Exceptions for a Defendant in a Criminal Case." This exception
would prevent the admission of prior bad act evidence without first requiring the
prosecution to overcome a heighted burden of admissibility. Rule 404(b)(3):
(3) Exceptions for a Defendant in a Criminal Case. In a
criminal case, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act shall only
be admitted if the prosecution can prove that the probative value
of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial value.
By including a subsection (3) exception, the rule will show the
importance of requiring a heightened standard for criminal defendants, while
leaving the rule otherwise untouched for when either party wishes to introduce
evidence of prior bad acts against anyone else.
Another benefit of amending the rules in this fashion is that it will not
affect the application of any Rule of Evidence, while still being rooted in the

201

See W. VA. R. EvID. 404.

202

W. VA. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).

203

W. VA. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).

204

W. VA. R. EvID. 404(b).

205

W. VA. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).

206

W. VA. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
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familiar principles of the reverse Rule 403 standard in Rule 609. Just like
amending Rule 403, there would be no new standards courts would have to
juggle within the years following the amendment. This existing familiarity is the
most appealing aspect of amending the rules to incorporate a reverse Rule 403
standard.
ii.

ProhibitivePurposes

Finally, Rule 404(b)(1) could be directly amended to require a
heightened standard for all evidence offered under the rule. During the last public
comment period for amendments to the West Virginia Rule of Evidence, Justice
Cleckley joined Professor Marjorie McDiarmid in drafting proposed
amendments to the rules.2 °7 Among those proposed amendments included adding
a "Prohibited Uses" section to Rule 404(b):
Prohibited Uses. [elvidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character. When evidence is offered, which is subject to this
rule, there shall be a presumption that it is being offered for this
prohibitive purpose.208
Justice Cleckley's acknowledgement that Rule 404(b) needs amended
should carry substantial consideration when determining whether Rule 404(b)
should be amended. After all, it was Justice Cleckley that took the steps forward
in protecting defendants when the United State Supreme Court would not. 2 9
This proposed amendment would require that the proponent of any prior
bad act evidence overcome the burden of proving that the evidence is not only
being offered for a valid purpose, but that such evidence is not being offered as
pretext for a prohibited purpose. 210 This method marks a distinct way of
approaching prior bad act evidence-by stepping aside from the reverse Rule
403 language and providing a direct method of addressing prior bad act evidence.
One drawback to this approach is the meshing of both an exclusionary rule and
a qualifying clause that govern when the rule should apply. When read together,
the added section which covers when evidence is offered seems out of place in
the section governing prohibited uses.

207

Cleckley & McDiarmid, supra note 190.

Id. (emphasis added). Many of their proposed amendments, including Rule 104(c)(1), Rule
408(2), and Rule 411, were adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia. Compare
Cleckley & MeDiarmid, supra note 190, with W. VA. R. EvID. 104(c)(1), 408, 411.
209
See State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994).
208

210

See Ordover, supranote 146, at 140-41; TheNeedtoAmend, supranote 37, at 1487; Milich,

supranote 145, at 797-98.
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To address this concern, this "presumption" clause could be moved to a
later section in the rule. Following a similar construction from above, adding a
Rule 404(b)(3) section would be the most logical method of including this clause.
Rule 404(b)(3) would read:
(3) Exceptions for a Defendant in a Criminal Case. When
evidence is offered, which is subject to this rule, there shall be a
presumption that it is being offered for this prohibitive purpose.
Drafting the rule this way not only takes away plain language ambiguity,
but it also allows a distinct subsection to Rule 404(b) evidence in a criminal
trial-specifically governing the part of the rule that needs amending.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rule 404(b) and introducing prior bad act evidence has long been an area
of concern. The time is now for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
to acknowledge that Rule 404(b) remains, to this date, the most litigated Rule of
Evidence. Furthermore, the time is now for Rule 404(b) to be amended to reflect
a rule that can better serve criminal defendants.
Concerns about how prior bad act evidence have been prevalent since
before the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated. 1' Long before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court's Huddleston
decision, courts nationwide could not find a uniform method of applying the rule.
Although the Supreme Court addressed the concerns associated with introducing
evidence under Rule 404(b), the issue lies in several factors. The first concern
with Rule 404(b) is there is great inconsistency in how the rule is applied among
jurisdictions-even within the same jurisdiction. 12 The second concern is that
states like West Virginia, who adopted a stricter test than that in Huddleston, are
still faced with issues surrounding the rule. The need to amend Rule 404(b)
seems as necessary as ever because even after introducing a stricter test, courts
could not find consistency applying the rule.
In West Virginia, over 20 years of court opinions have neither helped
defense attorneys predict when prior bad act evidence will be admissible, nor
made any helpful steps in adding protections to defendants against the dangers
of prior bad act evidence. The time is now that prior bad act evidence be
reevaluated and amended to change how courts apply Rule 404(b) going forward.
Looking to how the West Virginia Rules of Evidence could be amended to
effectuate the desired result, three realistic options emerge for the courts to
adopt-which fall back on one primary principle: Rule 404(b) evidence must be
held to a higher standard of scrutiny.

211

See The Need to Amend, supra note 37, at 1465.

212

See "Where There's Smoke," supra note 147.
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First, the reverse Rule 403 standard could be implemented through a
more substantive change to the Rule of Evidence. To properly make this change,
Rules 403 and 404 would be amended. Rule 403 would be split up into two
sections: Rules 403(a) and 403(b). Rule 403(a) would represent the traditional
Rule 403 standard, and Rule 403(b) would represent the reverse Rule 403
standard, providing both 404 and 609 with a consistent hardline rule that can be
applied uniformly.
Second, Rule 404(b) could be amended to include a third sub-section,
Rule 404(b)(3), to provide that when prior bad act evidence is being offered
against a criminal defendant, the court should only admit the evidence if the
proponent can show that the evidence's probative value substantially outweighs
the prejudicial value. This standard is used in Rule 609(b)(1) for when courts
determine whether a prior criminal conviction should be introduced for
impeachment. This reverse Rule 403 approach is appealing because of its
familiarity among courts and would not likely lead to misinterpretation.
Finally, Rule 404(b) itself could be amended to include a prohibitive
purposes clause. This section would provide that whenever prior bad act
evidence is offered, the court should presume that the prior bad act evidence is
being offered for one of the prohibited purposes. This change would be made
through the same method, by creating a third section in 404(b) to include this
clause.
By adopting a heightened standard of scrutiny for prior bad act evidence,
West Virginia can set the bar for how all jurisdictions can protect defendants
from the dangers of introducing prior bad act evidence. Clearly, the proposed
amendments will not bar all prior bad act evidence from being introduced as this
is not the intention of the proposed amendments. The intention is to provide an
added layer of protection for people like Wesley McCoy--defendants labeled by
their prior bad acts and unable to get a fair shake at trial. The time is now for
Rule 404(b) to be amended.
Sean D. Thomas*

J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, 2019; B.S. in Criminal Justice,

Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 2014; Executive Publications Editor, Volume 121 of the
West VirginiaLaw Review. The Author would like to thank Professor Marjorie McDiarmid at the
West Virginia University College of Law for her advice and guidance on this topic as well as her
comments on earlier drafts. The Author would also like to thank his fellow editors on the West
VirginiaLaw Review for all of their hard work and effort publishing this Note. Any errors contained

herein are the Author's alone.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/10

28

